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1 Introduction
The international oil market has very specific characteristics. It is dominated by a few large
producers, though only one producer can alter supply by such significant quantities that she
is able to influence prices substantially. This is the ’swing producer’ Saudi Aramco. But
of course, international oil markets are hardly comparable to European labor markets. Or
are they? In this paper we demonstrate that indeed there is a ’swing demander’ for female
labor. Concretely, we show that in Europe the public sector is key in determining relative
incomes being responsible for half of the significant reduction of the gender wage gap during
the period 2003 to 2013.
One of the main motivations of our paper relates to the fact that in Europe a peculiar role
accrues to the public sector exhibiting an extremely high female labor intensity (68%) and
further being substantially larger than in other advanced economies (employing 23% of the
labor force). The starting point of our considerations though, is the observation that in
the post-war period in most industrialized economies female employment has increased and
the gender wage gap has experienced a trend decline; albeit not a steady one (Olivetti and
Petrongolo, 2016). This co-movement of quantities and prices into the same direction can
be taken as materialization of a positive shift in demand.
Several explanations have been invoked for this development. There has been a shift from
routine to non-routine and from physical to non-physical tasks (Beaudry and Lewis, 2014).
Linked to this are the findings of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014, 2016) who demonstrate that
the bulk of the increase in female labor demand can be explained by the secular increase
of the service sector in which female employment tends to increase far more rapidly than
that of men (Olivetti, 2013). The fact that it is particularly women who specialize in service
professions can possibly be explained by models based on tastes for discrimination (Blau
and Kahn, 2016) and also by the social (gender) identity model that points at social norms
of appropriate and inappropriate activities for women as well as child-rearing practices and
psychological factors (Bertrand, 2011). Accordingly, women typically perform the bulk of
home production, which goes together with a negative correlation between home hours and
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earnings across spouses (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2009). This development again is likely linked
to the finding that a higher degree of substitution between market and non-market services
can account for a large amount of the increase in female labor market participation in the
US (Akbulut, 2011). Crucial for our purposes is the following implication: the elasticity of
substitution between men and women across sectors is far from infinity and changes in the
sectoral composition thus can causally drive the gender wage gap.
In this regard we should further note that the experience and education of the female work-
force has largely caught up with that of men yielding a substantial decline in that part of
the overall gender wage gap that can be explained by individual-specific factors. As the rel-
evance of these effects declined, the relative importance of the remaining part of the gender
wage gap increased steadily.1 As a result the determinants of the ’corrected’ gender wage
gap (assuming homogenized human capital endowments in terms of experience and educa-
tion) have become increasingly important. In Europe in some cases the ’corrected’ gender
wage gap even exceeds the uncorrected suggesting that female characteristics have become
superior to those of men (Christofides et al., 2013a) Yet, – given sectoral segregation – it is
exactly this part of the gender wage gap that reflects the effects of changes in the sectoral
composition of the economy.
These findings decisively affect the choice of our research design. As we are interested in
explaining the corrected gender wage gap, we start out estimating that part of the gender
wage gap that is not linked to individual specific factors, like skills or experience. This
results in a consistent and unique macro-panel of corrected gender wage gaps for 30 European
countries in the period 2003 to 2013. Based on this data, we are able to analyze the immediate
and direct effects of a change in female labor demand on relative wages over time. By
quantifying the contribution of the public sector in shaping female labor demand, we can
finally determine the role of the public sector in driving the gender wage gap in Europe.
It is noteworthy that our setting is suitable to verify causality of our results and to rule
out potential composition effects (i.e., a mechanical compression of the wage gap due to an
1See for instance Gallen et al. (2018), Blau and Kahn (2016) or Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) for general
reviews.
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increasing weight of a more egalitarian sector).
Our results can directly be linked to the findings of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014, 2016) on
the interdependency between industry structure and gender outcomes and the decisive role of
the service sector played in this regard. However, apart from applying a completely different
methodology, we are the first to demonstrate that – within the European service industry –
it is specifically the publicly influenced sector that is driving the gender wage gap. This also
links us to the results of Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso (2019) published in this journal who
show that pay freezes in the public sector had been responsible for the increase in the Italian
gender wage gap in the period of 2009-2011. In contrast to their analysis, we have to rely on
a broader concept of the public sector, i.e. typically highly publicly influenced sectors of the
economy, to obtain a homogeneous definition across European countries.2 This, however,
allows us to show that public employment policies cannot only have an effect by freezing
wages but by shifting equilibrium demand for female labor. These demand shifts have not
only an immediate impact on relative wages in the public sector but spill-over to the private
sector and hence influence the overall gender wage gap in the economy.
This paper is structured as follows. We start by setting out a simple accounting framework
(section 2). This will serve as a basis for our empirical setting. We will then devote some space
to the question how we estimate ’corrected’ gender wage gaps and how we control for potential
composition effects in order to isolate pure demand effects (section 3). Subsequently, we will
introduce the empirical model to analyze the impact of demand and supply on the gender
wage gap (section 4). This includes a discussion on the measurement of demand and supply
and, more importantly, a sub-section where we quantify the contribution of the public sector
in shaping female labor demand. Finally, we will present the results of our empirical model
and their robustness (section 5) and conclude by pointing at some policy implications (section
6).
2Our definition of the publicly influenced sector is based on the NACE classification and comprises the
sectors public administration and defence, education, human health and social work activities. The definition
in Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso (2019) is based on a survey question that specifically asks the respondent if
he/she is employed in the public or in the private sector (only available for Italy).
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2 Accounting framework
When investigating the determinants of sectoral demand, we build on a reduced form of the
model derived in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014). This allows us to remain relatively brief.
The starting point is a standard production function with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) between inputs over the entire production horizon, simplified by focusing solely on
the labor force. We hereby diversify into male and female labor supply:
Qs = [βsL
σ−1
σ
fs + (1− βs)L
σ−1
σ
ms ]
σ
σ−1 θs (1)
The quantity of output supplied by a respective sector s is denoted as Qs and f and m are
indexes for females and males, respectively. Further, σ denotes the elasticity of substitution
between male and female labor. Given that men and women can be considered to constitute
imperfect substitutes on labor markets we have 0 < σ <∞ , β defines the share of activities
performed in a respective sector by women and θ denotes demand.
Assuming perfect labor mobility across sectors (i.e. Wfs =Wf ) and that production factors
receive marginal productivity wages yields the demand-determined gender wage gap:
WD : ln
Wf
Wm
=
1
σ
ln
Σs(β
σ
sQs)
Σs(1− βs)σQs −
1
σ
ln
Lf
Lm
=
1
σ
[ln
Σs(β
σ
sQs)
Σs(1− βs)σQs − ln
Lf
Lm
] (2)
The framework closes with a simple labor supply function. Wages are set as a function of
the elasticity of the labor supply η > 0 and an autonomous labor supply shift factor λs:
L
1
η
f =Wfλf (3)
Calculating gaps, taking logs, setting ln
λf
λm
= λ and further reformulating leaves us with the
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supply-side gender wage gap:
WS : ln
Wf
Wm
=
1
η
ln
Lf
Lm
− λ (4)
Equilibrium gender wage gaps are identified by the intersection of the supply and demand
functions. Let us abbreviate the expression ln Σs(β
σ
sQs)
Σs(1−βs)σQs from (2) as βQ, which can be
read as the relative intensity of production performed by women. Deriving the equilibrium
gender employment gap, resubstituting, inverting and taking differences over time allows us
to investigate the determinants of changes in the gender wage gap:
∆GAP = −( 1
σ + η
)(∆βQ+ β∆Q) + (
η
σ + η
)∆λ (5)
Thus there are demand factors (i.e. ∆βQ + β∆Q) as well as supply factors (i.e. ∆λ) that
potentially explain changes in the gender wage gap over time. Of these factors, demand
is determined in a twofold way. It might be driven by a change of relative inputs ∆βQ,
the within-industry effect. Alternatively demand can be determined by changes in relative
sectoral demand β∆Q, the between-industry component.
Given our main interest, we focus exclusively on the between-industry effect here; in our
case β∆Q. The between-industry dimension hereby captures general equilibrium effects of
changes in the relative importance of certain sectors, including reactions to cyclical factors.
As it is short to medium run perspective that we are primarily interested in we will concen-
trate on between-industry effects β∆Q in the following. This is equivalent with assuming
∆βQ = 0. The bias accruing out of this choice usually is regarded to be rather small and
manageable (Katz and Murphy, 1992). Further, measuring labor demand by actual quanti-
ties, we proxy demand with employment L. This yields:
∆GAP = −( 1
σ + η
)β∆L+ (
η
σ + η
)∆λ (6)
In terms of the interpretation of β∆L provided above, this means that we will be able to
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approximate our simplified version of between-industry changes by the change in relative
employment of the respective industries.
3 Estimating the remuneration gap
Our major interest – as argued above – is on the immediate and direct demand effect of
a change in the sectoral composition of the economy. More precisely, we aim to analyze
whether one sector (the public sector in our case) has the power to influence equilibrium
prices in the entire economy. This however, necessitates isolating that part of the gender pay
gap that is not linked to individual specific effects. This is what we do in this chapter. We
disentangle those parts of the gender pay gap that are driven by individual specific factors
from those that are determined by other factors amongst which demand and supply figure
prominently.
Hereby, we would like to note that we are among the first contributions to provide a macro
panel of estimated gender wage gaps reflecting the relative remuneration of men and women.
Among the few contributions that focus on a cross-country or time-varying perspective3, only
Blau and Kahn (2003) provide an international comparison of gender wage gaps over time.4
The main aim of the paper by Blau and Kahn (2003) is to explain international differences
in gender pay gaps by focusing on the role of institutions. Therefore, the authors estimate
wage differentials on the assumption that men and women have the same average human
endowment levels as U.S. men and women across all countries. Hence, their estimation strat-
egy removes international differences in women’s relative levels of measured characteristics,
but still preserves gender differences in measured characteristics in each country, namely at
U.S. levels. By doing so, they are able to isolate the impact of the wage structure on gender
pay gaps. In contrast, given our question of interest, we remove all potential differences in
3E.g. Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005); Meulders et al. (2006); Arulampalam et al. (2007);
Beblo et al. (2003); Brainerd (2000); Blau and Kahn (1996, 2003); Boeheim et al. (2007); Christofides et al.
(2013b); Nicodemo (2009); Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008, 2014).
4Blau and Kahn (2003) construct a sample covering 15 European and 7 non-European countries in the
period 1985 to 1994, where each country appears 4.5 times on average during this period yielding a panel of
100 observations.
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men’s and women’s capital endowments and other job-related variables in order to isolate
potential differences in prices, that is the remuneration of these endowments.
To tackle this issue, we rely on data from the EU-Survey of Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC), which is frequently used to analyze income disparities along various dimensions
(see e.g. Pittau et al. (2015) and Beblo and Knaus (2001)). EU-SILC is a household-survey
that is representative for the countries’ population. The data set comprises a wide range
of individual and household characteristics including annual gross income and has been
conducted at an annual frequency since 2004. This allows us to construct a consistent panel
data set that comprehensively covers the European region for a considerable amount of time.
Given certain sample restrictions, we are able to estimate gender wage gaps based on 283
individual country-year data sets covering 30 European countries over eleven years. For an
overview of the participating countries and of specific restrictions regarding certain waves of
the survey see table A1 in the appendix.
3.1 Sample selection
Before we move on to estimate the remuneration gap, we want to briefly elaborate on the
issue of sample selection. In particular, the selection of an ’employed’ sub-sample of the
population, directly leads to the question if differences in the probability of selection be-
tween men and women significantly influence the estimation of average wage differentials.
Prominently, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) have shown the importance of correcting for
non-random sample selection in cross-country studies. In their study, uncorrected gaps are
generally underestimated in countries with low female participation due to the fact that on
average in these economies only high-wage females are in employment; a feature which is also
found in Christofides et al. (2013b) for a cross-section of European countries, and reported
in an overview of Beblo et al. (2003), in which many single-country studies report significant
selection effects.
While it seems very reasonable to control for selection in order to compare gender wage
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gaps across countries5, we opt not to correct for selection in our baseline model for two
reasons. First, the focus of our paper is to explain changes in gender wage gaps over time
rather than levels across countries. Hence, cross-country differences in gender pay gaps that
are attributable to differences in employment gaps across countries (as shown by Olivetti
and Petrongolo (2008)) are potentially wiped out in our setting. This is corroborated by
the fact that the correlation coefficient between the remuneration gap and the employment
gap is -0.51 in our sample, which is remarkably close to the figure found by Olivetti and
Petrongolo (2008). However, if we take first differences of both variables we end up with a
correlation coefficient of -0.15. Second, we explicitly model the gender wage gap as a function
of (relative) female labor supply, i.e. we account for the fact that wages are only observed
for those women that are employed (see also Blau and Kahn (2003), p. 120 for a related
argument). However, we will compare our baseline results with a model specification that
controls for selection6 as this might unveil an interesting insight into the mechanism by which
an increase in female labor supply can affect the gender wage gap. More precisely, an increase
in labor supply can either lower average female wages (i) by changing the composition of low-
and high-wage women in the economy, e.g. as more low-wage females enter the labor market
or (ii) by lowering equilibrium wages (pure supply effect) induced by a right-ward shift of
the labor supply curve (or both). Comparing our baseline results with a specification that
controls for selection by assigning higher weights to underrepresented women can isolate the
latter effect from the former.
3.2 Disentangling the total wage gap
We now proceed to estimate gender wage gaps for each country-year pair. We will start by
calculating the total gender wage gap, i.e. the difference between mean log-hourly wages of
5Especially, European countries show substantial differences in employment rates (sample participation)
of males and females. While in Nordic countries both participation-rates are above 90% for both men and
women, in Southern European countries they are around 80% for males and 45% for females.
6More specifically, we use a two-stage Heckman (1979) selection model to account for non-random selection
into employment. We estimate the first-stage probit-equation for females only, i.e. assuming random selection
for males. The identification of the first-stage is based on a dummy if the woman is married, a variable in logs
comprising the income of the spouse (if any) and other financial household income, and a dummy indicating
the presence of young children in the woman’s household.
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males and females. Within each micro data file, we restrict our baseline sample to employees
aged 16-64 years. We exclude the self-employed from the sample as income information for
this group is measured only imprecisely, which might introduce a bias in our wage gap esti-
mates. However, as a robustness check we will include the group of self-employed and present
the respective results in section 5.3. Likewise, we will investigate the effect of restricting our
sample to the group of employees aged 26-55 (see e.g., Christofides et al. (2013b)). As we
are mainly interested in the relative remuneration between men and women, we have to
single out the part of the total gender wage gap that reflects differences in endowments.
Fortunately, the EU-SILC data allows us to estimate average wage differentials while cor-
recting for individual-specific differences in characteristics. We thus can derive that part of
the gender wage gap that is not determined by individual factors – commonly referred to
as the remuneration effect, which is separated from the endowment effect. This is typically
done by estimating separate wage equations for males and females with wit,m/f indicating
the log-gross hourly wage of males and females (m/f) for country i of year t (skipping the
subscript of the individuals). The average wage-differential (i.e. total gender wage gap)
∆w¯it = w¯it,m − w¯it,f can be decomposed employing a framework introduced by Oaxaca
(1973) & Blinder (1973) and prominently extended by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994):
∆w¯it = (γˆit,m − γ∗it)X¯it,m + (γ∗it − γˆit,f )X¯it,f︸ ︷︷ ︸
remuneration effect (GAP)
+ γ∗it(X¯it,m − X¯it,f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
endowment effect
(7)
where γ∗it is referred to as the non-discriminatory wage structure and γˆit,m/f as the coefficient
from the separate wage equations that are estimated by OLS.7
The independent variable, wit,m/f , is calculated from annual gross-income (“employee cash
or near cash income”) divided by total hours worked within the income year (including not
only the main but any additional jobs). Note that all countries except the United Kingdom
7Note that γ∗it can be defined as a weighted coefficient γ
∗
it = Ωitγit,m + (I − Ωit)γit,f , where γ∗it can be
set to the male-wage structure only (Ω = I), to the female wage-structure only (Ω = 0), or to the half of
each as in Reimers (1983) (Ω = .5I). Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Neumark (1988) derived Ω from a
pooled wage-equation. We opt for the first alternative, i.e. Ω = I. Note however, that choosing the other
alternatives do not qualitatively change the estimation results presented in the next section.
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provide income data for the calendar year preceding the interview, while the UK publishes
income statements for the current year8. Therefore, the gaps estimated from survey-year t
refer to year t− 1 (except for the UK).
To ensure high comparability across countries and over time, the set of explanatory vari-
ables Xit,m/f is comprised of a minimum selection of important variables describing major
compositional characteristics of the aggregated work-force. The set includes education dum-
mies, a part-time-dummy (Erosa et al., 2016), as well as work-experience and its square.9
Finally, estimating equation (7) gives us 283 country-year observations of both, the remu-
neration and the endowment effect of the total gender wage gap. The remuneration effect
will serve as our baseline gender wage gap specification throughout the paper. From now
on we will use remuneration effect and gender wage gap interchangeably. Note that we do
not control for occupation in our baseline estimation as it is unclear whether a higher pay
in male-dominated occupations is a result of women allocating themselves into lower-payed
professions or whether it represents discrimination. However, as a robustness check we will
re-calculate the remuneration gap by including occupational controls in order to see whether
this affects our estimation results. We will discuss the respective results in the robustness
section.10
8Ireland switched from a moving 12-month period to a fixed-calendar-year period in 2009. However, it
cannot be exactly determined when the interview took place during the survey year, so that the income period
cannot be located exactly before 2009. We therefore treat the income data for the years 2004-2008 as data
from the period 2003-2007.
9We lump the pre-primary, primary, and the lower secondary group together. As a result we get three
education categories: Primary/Lower Secondary, Upper Secondary (incl. post-secondary), and Tertiary. Note
also, that in some countries work-experience is not available. In this case we add age and age-squared to the
list of controls to proxy work experience (see also table A1).
10We use the ISCO-08 classification, which groups occupations in ten categories. Due to some missing
observations in individual countries we form eight categories to yield a consistent set of occupational variables
across countries and years. Note that we loose two country-year observations compared to our baseline
specification. The occupation categories are (1) managers, (2) professionals, (3) technicians ans associate
professionals, (4) clerical support workers, (5) services and sales workers, (6) skilled Agricultural, Forestry
and Fishery Workers, craft and related trades workers, (7) plant and machine operators and assemblers, (8)
elementary occupations. See also http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.
htm
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3.3 Sectoral differences and the composition of the gender wage gap
Figure 1: Remuneration gap, unweighted aver-
ages of 30 European countries
In this sub-section we discuss how to control
for potential composition effects in our empir-
ical model in order to isolate pure demand ef-
fects. We start by plotting the development of
the overall gender wage gap in Europe for the
years 2003 to 2013, depicted by the bold line
in figure 1. We observe a decrease of the gen-
der wage gap by roughly 3.5 percentage points
during the observation period. In addition, we
calculate the remuneration effect for the private
and the public sector, i.e. we separately estimate
equation (7) based on men’s and women’s wages in the respective sectors. The public sec-
tor in our definition hereby consists of public administration and defense, education, health
and social work; sectors that in Europe can be reasonably assumed to be primarily publicly
influenced. The results, again unweighted averages, are depicted by the dashed lines, which
show that the remuneration gap of men and women is on average considerably smaller in the
public sector. Similar results have been observed in the literature, e.g. by Stewart (2014)
for the UK or by Cheng (2005) for Canada. Yet, this finding is not surprising given that
the total (unadjusted) gender wag gap is lower in the public sector in most of the European
countries for which data are available11. One reason might be that in most European coun-
tries, public sector employees are protected by collective pay agreements and other similar
contracts establishing pay structures.
Interestingly, our estimation results also indicate that the difference in the gender wage gap
across the two sectors seems to be quite persistent over time and their evolution further
coincides with that of the total gender wage gap. As we will show in the next section, the
importance of the public sector increased over time. Given the smaller gender wage gap in
11Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Gender_pay_
gap_statistics#By_economic_activity
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this sector, it is thus not obvious which part of any given reduction in the total gender wage
gap is driven by changes of relative demand (a pure demand effect) and which is determined
by a mechanical compression driven by the fact that the public sector has become relatively
more important in the calculation of the total gender wage gap (composition effect).
In order to overcome this problem we re-calculate our baseline estimation of the remuneration
effect by additionally controlling for potential sectoral effects.12 More precisely, we include
a public sector dummy in the wage equations of men and women in order to net out that
part of the wage that is attributable to the sector. The result is depicted by the solid line
with dots and again represents unweighted averages of all countries. What stands out is
the quite high overlap of this series with the baseline gender wage gap (with the exception
of 2003 data). This is an important first indication that the decrease in the remuneration
effect in Europe is not the result of a composition effect. Of course, however, the graph
masks developments across individual countries and the small but clearly visible deviations
between both series might still reflect compositional effects. Therefore, we will consider both
series in the panel estimation model in order to see whether labor demand effects change
when compositional effects are wiped out in the estimation of remuneration effects.
In table A2 we present descriptive statistics of the total gender wage gap, the baseline
remuneration gap and several other specifications of the remuneration gap including the one
where selection is controlled for.
4 The empirical model
Given our accounting framework introduced in section 2 and the empirical specification of the
gender wage gap in the previous section, we are now in the position to derive the empirical
model. This will allow us to estimate the impact of supply and demand factors on the gender
wage gap in Europe. In line with equation (6) the change in the gender wage gap ∆GAPi,t
12Be aware that the total GAP cannot be decomposed in a linear fashion, i.e. it is not simply a weighted
average of the public and the private gender wage gap. If this were the case, we could simply isolate the
demand effect by holding the weight constant over time.
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is a linear function of changes in relative demand ∆Di,t and relative supply ∆Si,t of female
labor. Hence, our empirical specification can be written as
∆GAPi,t = α1 + α2∆Di,t + α3∆Si,t + i,t (8)
Based on this equation, we will verify the derived hypothesis for 30 European countries in the
period from 2003 to 2013.13 In particular, we expect demand to impact the gender wage gap
negatively (α2 < 0) while supply should have a positive influence (α3 > 0). Note that, we do
not include unobservable country fixed effects into our empirical model, as we are estimating
a first difference equation, where time constant variables are wiped out by construction.
Hence, we will employ the pooled OLS estimator to estimate equation (8), which avoids
a potential bias due to time invariant omitted variables (Baltagi, 2005). Also, we do not
include time fixed effects as they are not significant in our setting. We will demonstrate this
in the course of our robustness analysis in section 5.3.
By implementing the OLS estimator for our baseline specification, we assume that gender
wage gaps do not influence relative labor demand and supply. Although we think that reverse
causality is not a problem in our context14, we will explicitly address this issue in the next
section, where we will employ a GMM estimator to control for potential endogeneity issues
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).
4.1 Measuring demand and supply effects
In order to estimate equation (8) we need to first specify the two main determinants of
the gender wage gap, namely between-industry changes in relative labor demand Di,t and
relative supply Si,t. With regard to the first mentioned variable, we follow Katz and Murphy
(1992) and Blau and Kahn (2003) who construct an index that indicates whether a change
13Since our estimates of gender wage gaps are not available since 2003 for all countries, our panel data set
is comprised of 283 observations.
14In order to have reverse causality, a relative reduction of female remuneration would have to yield
higher demand for products from female sectors via lower relative prices. This situation would require a high
elasticity of substitution between the respective products (and a fixed mark-up). However, at the rather high
level of sectoral aggregation that we are observing, the elasticity of substitution is likely to be extremely low,
so that we can rule out this situation at least for the within-country perspective.
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in the composition of output by industry is favorable for women. The demand index Di,t
is composed of the relative gender intensity in a respective industry at a specific point in
time and the change in employment of that industry over time with respect to a base year
t0 = 2003. Note that Blau and Kahn (2003) measure the change in sectoral employment
relative to a base year and a specific country (the US) as they aim to explain international
differences of gender wage gaps across countries. However, given that we want to specifically
exploit changes of the gender wage gap over time (i.e., the within-country dimension of the
data) we fix employment to a common base year only. Notating employment as L and the
fraction of female employees in sector s as b, the demand index of country i in year t can be
written as:
Di,t = Σsbi,s∆Li,s,t = Σsbi,s(
Li,s,t
Li,t
/
Li,s,t0
Li,t0
− 1) (9)
The weighting factor bi,s represents the relative abundance of female employees in the re-
spective sectors at a specific point in time, i.e.
bi,s =
Lfi,s
Li
(10)
where Li is the sum of male (m) and female (f) employment, i.e. Li = L
m
i + L
f
i .
15 In
accordance with Blau and Kahn (2003) we fix gender intensity bi,s to a base year (2003)
in order to have an exogenous measure of demand changes that is not influenced by price
changes caused by the demand shifts.16
In figure 2 we display the shares of female employment in total employment for each sector. In
three out of eight sectors (finance, public and arts) the share of female employment is higher
compared to men’s. However, what clearly stands out is that the share of female employment
is the highest in the public sector. Moreover, total employment in the public sector is
15Note that, at first glance, our measure deviates from the one used by Blau and Kahn (2003) who proxy
the relative gender intensity as Lfi,s/L
f
i . However, row-normalisation of this proxy yields the expression given
in equation (10), i.e., bi,s/Σs(L
f
i,s,t0/Li,t0) = L
f
i,s,t0/L
f
i,t0.
16Note that the choice of the base year does not qualitatively influence our estimation results, as we will
show in section 5.3.
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among the highest compared to other sectors. Hence, given this first inspection of sectoral
segregation on the labor market, it is presumable that the public sector plays a crucial role
in determining the relative demand for female labor. We will return to this issue in the next
subsection, where we will assess the impact of public sector employment on the demand index.
Figure 2: Sectoral employment, unweighted aver-
ages of 30 European countries. Source: Eurostat.
In addition to relative demand, we specify a vari-
able reflecting changes in the relative labor sup-
ply of women compared to that of men, here-
inafter referred to as Si,t. It would be ideal to
have an indirect measure of a female labor sup-
ply shifter. Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) for in-
stance have shown the effect of home production
decisions on relative incomes. Thus, time used
by females in home production would be an ideal
measure for female labor supply. However, in ab-
sence of the availability of time series for any such variables we resort to the avenue taken
by Blau and Kahn (2003), by measuring female labor supply by the relative abundance of
active women in a country’s work force. Hereby, λ denotes the fraction of active women (i.e.
either employed or job seeking) as a share of the total working age population (i.e. men and
women):
Si,t =
λi,t
λt0
− 1 (11)
To calculate Si,t and Di,t we use data from Eurostat, where comprehensive and comparable
statistics for all European countries are provided.17 More precisely, sectoral employment
data to calculate the demand index are obtained from national accounts, which cover the
whole economy, i.e. all persons engaged in some productive activity. We use the finest
17Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat (codes: lfsa egana to calculate gender intensity weights,
nama 10 a10 e for sectoral employment data, lfsa agan and lfsi emp a to measure relative supply).
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(a) ∆Ls,t (b) bs,2001∆Ls,t
(c) Dt = Σsbs,2001∆Ls,t, D
pub
t , D
priv
t (d) Dt, St
Figure 3: Demand and supply for female labor in Europe, unweighted averages of 30 European
countries
possible sector classification that is available for our country-year panel (NACE Rev.2 sector
classification, one-digit), which results in eight sectors.18 Note that we also use data from
the labor force survey (also obtained from Eurostat) to calculate an alternative measure for
18The sectors are: Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A), Industry (B-E), Construction (F), Wholesale and
retail trade, transport, accommodation, food service activities and information and communication (G-J),
Financial and insurance activities (K), Real estate activities, Professional, scientific and technical activities;
administrative and support service activities (L-N), Public administration, defence, education, human health
and social work activities (O-Q), Arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of
household and extra-territorial organizations and bodies (R-U). For a detailed description of the statistical
classification see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF.
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the demand index. This allows us to use a finer sector classification (11 instead of eight
sectors) but covers only an incomplete subset of total demand, as it includes only workers
aged 15-64. We will show in the robustness section 5.3 that using a different data source
does not have any significant impact on the estimation results.19
In figure 3 we aim to visualize the development of the specified variables in Europe since
2003. Plotting simple unweighted averages of the demand and supply variables across the
30 European countries reveals a quite interesting pattern regarding the role of the public
sector for female labor demand. Sub-figure 3a shows the employment trend in eight different
industries as a share of total employment, i.e. the part of equation (9) that corresponds
to ∆Li,s,t. As expected, employment in the service sector, especially activities included in
subcategory LN (i.e., real estate, professional and technical activities as well as administrative
and support service activities) registered a relative increase over the observation period,
while employment in the manufacturing (BE) and agricultural (A) sector has become less
important in relation to total employment. In contrast to these quite substantial employment
shifts across sectors over the last decade, the development of public sector employment
(OQ) does not really stand out as the share of public sector employment has increased by
only 10% over the same time period. However, if we weight the employment share of the
respective sectors by gender intensity (i.e., bs) we see that the public sector is one of the most
important contributors to female labor demand (see sub-figure 3b). More importantly, the
overall relative demand for female labor (sum of all sectors), which is depicted in sub-figure
3c (continuous line), is predominantly shaped by the variability of public sector employment.
This observation is even more visible when we split the demand index into two parts, such
that we can distinguish between female labor demand from the private (Dprivt ) and the
public sector (Dpubt ).
20 Both indexes are added to sub-figure 3c and are marked by dashed
lines. Finally, sub-figure 3d presents the development of both relative demand and supply
for female labor in Europe. On average, the demand for female labor has increased by 2.4
19Note that the labor force survey provides sectoral employment data at the two-digit level as well. How-
ever, due to a lot of missing observations, we could not use this data to obtain a finer demand index for our
sample.
20 Note that Dprivt = Dt−Dpubt where Dpubt is just the line ’Publ OQ’ drawn in subfigure 3b, i.e. bs,2001Ls,t
with s =OQ.
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percentage points, while the supply of female labor has risen by 3.1 percentage points over
the entire observation period.
4.2 The impact of public employment on female labor demand
In the previous subsection, we have seen that the development of female labor demand is very
much shaped by the variability of public sector demand. But to which extent has employment
in the public sector contributed to the rise in female labor demand? Since the next section will
present estimates of a 1 percentage point increase in overall relative demand on the gender
wage gap, knowing the public sector’s employment growth contribution to the development
of the overall demand index would finally allow assessing the direct influence stemming from
public sector employment on the gender wage gap. Yet, this is not a straightforward task,
as the demand index is a non-linear function of eight unknown variables influencing each
other.21 As we are not able to derive an analytical expression for the growth contribution,
we perform a counter-factual analysis, quantifying how overall female labor demand would
have developed if employment in individual sectors had evolved differently. By comparing
the outcomes with the actual development of the overall demand index ∆D, which increased
by 2.4 percentage points on average, we can infer the contribution of each sector.
In table 1 we summarize the results from three different exercises. The left column (memo
item) presents actual annual employment growth rates of each sector as an unweighted
average of all countries’ growth rates. Scenario (1) and (2) hereby are executed in order to
get a feeling how the demand index reflects different conditions and particularly what the
role of the public sector is for the determination of this variable. The counter-factual analysis
whose results are displayed at the right side of the table deduces the growth contribution of
each sector to the development of overall demand over the estimation period.
In scenario 1 we assume that employment in all sectors grows by 1% annually, except for
the observed sector, whose employment growth rate is set to zero. In order to additionally
21Note that public sector employment enters each of the non-linear components of the demand function
through the total employment term Li,t.
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eliminate the impact of sector size we further assume that each sector has 1,000 tsd. em-
ployees each in 2003. Hence, the numbers depicted in column (1) show the importance of
each sector assuming that all remaining sectors are equal with the exception of the level of
occupational segregation, i.e. the only influence stems from the gender intensity parameter
bi,s. Not surprisingly, we see that the highest (negative) impact on the demand index arises
if public sector employment were held constant. In this setting, the demand for female labor
would decrease by 2 percentage points. This mirrors the fact that the share of female em-
ployees is highest in the public sector (see also figure 2). In the second scenario, the sectors
are allowed to be of different (actual) size and employment is allowed to grow at its actual
rates with the exception of one sector, where the annual growth rate is assumed to be 1
percentage point lower compared to actual employment growth. For example, the number
for the public sector in column (2) shows how the demand index would have evolved, if
employment in the public sector had grown by 0.1% annually (instead of 1.1%, see memo
item).22 Again, we observe that lower employment growth in this sector impacts most on
the demand index. While the actual demand index has increased by 2.4 percentage points,
it would have increased by only 1.3 percentage points if public sector employment growth
were reduced by 1 percentage points annually.
Finally, the counter-factual exercise assumes that employment in all sectors grows at the
actual rate but fixes employment in the observed sector at the initial (2003) level, i.e. a zero
employment growth rate is assumed. This is equivalent to reversely deriving the contribu-
tion of this sector to the growth of overall relative demand for female labor. Looking at the
counter-factual demand indexes of this analysis provides a quite similar picture compared
to the second scenario. The highest deviations from actual demand are again recorded in
the public sector. If employment in this sector had been constant since 2003 the increase
in overall demand of female labor would have reduced to 1.2 percentage points. This simul-
taneously implies that overall demand would only have increased by 1.2 percentage points.
This is displayed in the column on the very right in which we show each sector’s individual
22Note that all numbers presented here are unweighted averages of all countries. However, the scenarios
are calculated on an individual country basis, i.e. if Austria has an annual actual employment rate of 2% in
the public sector, we reduce the growth rate to 1%. This applies also for the counter-factual analysis.
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Table 1: The impact of employment growth in single sectors on ∆D
memo item alt. scenarios counter-factual analysis
average ∆L scen. scen. ∆D if ∆L in contribution to
2003-2013 (1) (2) the sector is 0 actual ∆D (=2.4)
Agriculture (A) -2.2 0.6 2.6 2.0 0.4
Manufacturing (BE) -1.7 -0.3 2.8 2.0 0.4
Construction (F) -0.2 1.0 2.7 2.1 0.3
Trade (GJ) 0.8 -1.2 2.6 2.5 -0.1
Finance (K) 1.3 0.8 2.3 2.3 0.1
Real Estate (LN) 3.6 0.5 2.4 2.9 -0.4
Public (OQ) 1.1 -2.0 1.3 1.2 1.2
Arts (RU) 1.8 0.5 2.1 1.9 0.5
The actual demand index (D) grew by 2.4 percentage points. Numbers represent unweighted averages of 30 European
countries. The first column shows how employment in individual sectors has evolved over time (average annual growth
rates in %). Columns 1 to 2 show female labor demand effects from 2003 to 2013 (in percentage points) under alternative
scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes equal sectors’ size in 2003 (1,000 tsd. persons) and a growth rate of 1% annual employment
growth (∆L) for each but the observed sector (which has a growth rate of zero). Scenario 2 assumes actual employment
growth in all sectors but reduces the annual growth rate of the observed sector by 1 percentage point (compared to
actual employment growth). Column 3-4 – the counter-factual – is used to calculate contributions to the growth of
demand. It assumes actual employment growth in all sectors but fixes employment in the observed sector at the initial
(2003) level.
contribution to growth of demand, the sum of which, obviously, aggregates to 2.4. Hence, we
can conclude that the growth contribution stemming from the public sector has accounted
for half of the change in the overall demand index throughout the observation period.
Yet, from the counter-factual analysis we can also infer the role of the service sector as a
whole in shaping overall labor demand. This can be done by summing up the individual
contributions of the relevant sectors (i.e. trade, finance, real estate, public and arts) which
results in an overall growth contribution of 1.3 percentage points. Hence, if employment in
the service sector had stagnated in the period 2003 to 2013, female labor demand would have
increased only by 1.1 percentage points. Obviously, nearly the entire contribution stemming
from the service sector can be attributed to the public sector. At this point, it is worthwhile to
recall the important insights of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) who demonstrated – applying
a shift-share analysis already pioneered in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) – that the secular
increase of the service sector accounts for the major part of the structural increase in female
labor demand. According to our analysis we can hence confirm their findings. Moreover,
we can add that, at least in the European context looking at a more recent period, it is
particularly publicly influenced services – i.e. the public sector – that are responsible for the
20
increase in female labor demand.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Estimations
Table 2 presents the results of our empirical model introduced in equation (8) of section 4.
Columns (1) to (5) show the estimated demand and supply effects for different specifications
of the remuneration gap that have been discussed in detail in section 3. In column (1) we
start out to show coefficient estimates for our baseline gender wage gap specification. The
results reveal a negative impact of female labor demand on the gender wage gap while the
impact of supply is positive. Moreover, both coefficient estimates are highly significant and
strongly support the hypothesis predicted by our accounting framework. This result supports
the empirical analysis of Blau and Kahn (2003) who – though in a different empirical setup
– find some indication of female net supply effects.23 At this point, we can hence conclude
that changes in demand and supply of female labor seem to have significantly affected the
development of gender wage gaps in European countries over the period 2003 to 2013.
According to the point estimates, a one percentage point increase in the demand for female
labor has reduced gender wage gaps by 1.5 percentage points. If we recall that female
labor demand has increased by 2.4 percentage points on average throughout the observation
period, the gender wage gap would have been reduced by 3.6 percentage points all else equal.
More importantly, as we have shown in the previous section, half of the increase in overall
female labor demand can be attributed to public sector employment. Hence, if employment
in the public sector were constant in all countries over the entire period, the gender wage gap
would have been higher by 1.8 percentage points on average. This result is also economically
significant, given that the gender wage gap in Europe has decreased by 3.5 percentage points
23In particular, Blau and Kahn (2003) analyze the relationship between wage-setting institutions and
gender wage gaps across 15 European and 7 non-European countries in the period 1985 to 1994. They find
strong evidence that institutions are driving international differences in gender wage gaps. Also, they find
some evidence that female net supply matters, at least in specifications where country fixed effects are not
controlled for. However, given their different empirical setting (e.g. different measurement of gender wage
gaps), we have to stress that a comparison to our results has its limitations.
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Table 2: Impact of demand and supply on the gender wage gap
baseline different estimations of ∆Gap
selection sector private public
∆Gap dummy sector sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆D -1.49*** -1.41*** -1.39*** -1.43*** -1.18***
(-5.05) (-3.32) (-4.97) (-3.79) (-3.25)
∆S 0.73*** 0.67* 0.77*** 0.65** 0.82***
(3.59) (1.86) (3.69) (2.38) (2.65)
Cons 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.62) (0.70) (0.10) (0.31) (-0.02)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 252 252 252 252 252
Two-tailed significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis.
throughout the entire observation period (i.e., from 2003 to 2013). Turning to the supply
side of the labor market, a one percentage point increase in female labor supply leads to a
rise in the gender wage gap by roughly 0.7 percentage points. Hence, from 2003 to 2013,
we would have observed an increase in the remuneration gap by 2.2 percentage points all
else equal. Thus, compared to the estimated impact of labor demand, the extent of supply
effects seems to be somewhat smaller.
In column (2) we present estimates of demand and supply effects on gender wage gaps
considering non-random sample selection. Notably, controlling for selection has hardly any
influence on the magnitude of both demand and supply effects. As far as the demand effect
is concerned, this is not a surprising result. Yet, the fact that the supply effect is still
significant indicates that an increase in labor supply indeed lowers equilibrium wages and
therefore leads to a rise in the gender wage gap. However, as indicated by the t-statistic,
the significance of the supply effect becomes weaker when sample selection is controlled for.
Hence, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that the supply effect estimated in the baseline
specification partly captures a composition effect that might arise with an increasing share
of low-wage females entering the labor market.
Related to this argument, the estimated demand effect might also be influenced by a po-
tential composition effect. As discussed in section 3.3, a sector with more compressed wage
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differentials could simply mechanically change an economy’s total remuneration gap when it
expands disproportionately without inducing demand shifts. Specifications (3) to (5) aim to
shed light on this ambiguity. First, in column (3) we re-estimate our model by employing a
gender wage gap specification that controls for the composition effect by netting out those
part of the estimated wages that stem from the respective sector. To put it differently, we
eliminate that part of wages from the gender wage gap calculation, which is determined by
the sector in which men and women are employed. Interestingly, this alteration does hardly
change our baseline results. The demand effect is reduced by 0.1 percentage points, which
is a negligibly small change, while the supply effect is even less affected. The statistical
significance of both coefficients remain broadly the same. Overall, this is a first indication
that the measured impact of female labor demand is indeed attributable to labor demand
shifts rather than to composition effects.
In columns (4) to (5) we want to explain each sector’s gender wage gap separately. Column
(4) presents demand and supply effects on the private sector gender wage gap, which again are
nearly unaffected compared to our baseline specification. On the one hand, this outcome is
not surprising given that the private sector is the far larger sector of each country’s economy
and thus is supposed to drive the baseline results, which cover the whole economy. On the
other hand, however, as public sector wages do not enter the gender wage gap calculation in
this specification, the demand effect should render insignificant if composition effects were
dominant in the baseline model. We do not observe any changes in the estimated demand
effect. From that we can deduce that our results are not driven by composition effects,
at least not by composition effects determined by the public sector. Obviously, changes in
female labor demand that are to a large extent driven by the public sector in our sample
seem to spill over to the private sector and to influence relative wages there. Interestingly,
the demand effect is less pronounced when demand and supply are regressed on the gender
wage gap in the public sector, as shown in column (5). This might be related to the generally
lower level of the wage gap in this sector. At the same time however, it should also be pointed
out that the observed difference is small and statistically not significant.
23
5.2 Placing public sector effects in context
In section 4.2 we have shown that employment growth in the public sector has been the
largest contributor to female labor demand among the eight sectors entering the demand
index. In this section we take a different approach to assess the role of the public sector
in determining gender wage gaps. In particular, we split the demand index in sub-indexes,
which allows us to investigate the relative importance of public sector demand as compared
to demand from other key segments of the economy such as for instance the goods producing
sector. By taking this avenue, we cannot isolate the contribution of each sector’s employment
growth to total female labor demand24 (in contrast to section 4.2), but we can estimate which
of the sub-indexes explains most of the observed variation in gender wage gaps and therefore
assess the relative importance of individual sectors in a more indirect way.
Table 3: Demand and supply effects of ∆GAP : standardized (β-) coefficients
(1) (2)
∆S 0.19*** 0.19***
(3.59) (3.62)
∆Dprivate -0.12**
(-2.03)
∆Dpublic -0.36*** -0.37***
(-5.16) (-5.19)
∆Dservice sector (without public) -0.14*
(-1.82)
∆Dgoods producing sector -0.16**
(-2.18)
Cons 0.00 0.00
(0.54) (0.20)
Model OLS OLS
N 252 252
Two-tailed significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis.
In the first column, we re-investigate the relative importance between the public and the pri-
vate sector in order to compare the results with the findings obtained by the counter-factual
analysis. Hence, we simply split the demand variable into two sub-components, Dpublic and
24Recall that each sector’s demand (i.e. the sub-indexes entering the total demand index additively) is
measured as the change in the share of employment in sector s to total employment. Hence, no implications
can be made to what extent employment growth in one particular sector can influence the gender wage gap.
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Dprivate. By re-estimating our baseline model with the two different sub-components, we
can asses the relative importance of the two sectors based on standardized (beta) coefficients
(Johnston and DiNardo, 2007). The estimates in column (1) reflect the effect of a one-
standard-deviation change in the respective demand and supply variables on the dependent
variable (also measured in standard deviations). Hence, the estimated magnitudes are com-
parable across variables as the latter are measured by the same metric. The results clearly
confirm the prominent role that accrues to the public sector. While a one-standard-deviation
increase in private sector demand decreases gender wage gaps by 0.12 standard deviations,
public sector demand exerts a three times higher impact on gender wage gaps. This result
strongly supports the findings presented so far and implies that the contribution of the public
sector, which was assessed to be one-half of the overall demand effect, is not over-estimated.
In the second column, we further split private sector demand into demand from the service
and demand from the goods producing sector. Given that female intensity is quite high
in service oriented industries and that a substantial portion of the rise in female hours in
industrialized economies is associated with the reallocation of labor from manufacturing into
services (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016), it might be plausible that private sector demand
masks important differences across the two industries. According to the estimates in column
(2) however there is no difference between the impact of the goods producing sector and
the service sector. Moreover, we also observe that the public sector still remains the most
relevant determinant. Hence, we can confirm our findings from the counter-factual analysis
presented in section 4.2, namely that within the service sector, it is public sector demand
that explains most of the variation in gender wage gaps.
At first sight, this result stands in contrast to Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) who find
that the public sector does not determine the cross-country variation in wage and hours
gap (but rather the service sector). However, this finding is not necessarily inconsistent
with our results. Apart from the different sample and methodology applied25, Olivetti and
25In particular, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) exploit the cross-country variation in gender gaps and hours
based on a shift-share analysis, where they have to assume a value for the elasticity of substitution between
male and female labor. Their empirical findings are based on 15 industrialized countries, including the US
and Canada. Gender gaps (in wages and hours) are calculated using micro data in the period from 1994-2001.
25
Petrongolo (2014) use a much narrower definition of the public sector. In particular, they
look at public sector administration and defense only, while the public sector in our definition
also includes education, health and social work (see also section 3.3), i.e. sectors that are
primarily publicly influenced in Europe. In our sample this difference is very significant as
the public administration and defense sector in Europe is neither a female intense sector nor
does it account for a considerable part of total employment.26
5.3 Robustness analysis
This sub-section discusses the robustness of our main findings, which are summarized in Table
3. The first column (0) is a memorandum item and reports our baseline results including 95%-
confidence intervals for the estimated effects (in square brackets). The subsequent columns
present robustness checks with respect to alternative gender wage gap estimations (1-3),
alternative specifications of the demand variable (4-6) and alternative estimation techniques
(7-8). Coefficient estimates that lie inside the confidence interval of the baseline results will
be classified as insignificant deviations from the baseline model.
As discussed in section 3, our baseline gender wage gap calculation does not control for
men’s and women’s occupations as it is unclear whether a higher pay in male-dominated
occupations is a result of preferences or discrimination (see also Blau and Kahn, 2000). If
it were discrimination, we would not want to wipe out differences in wages that arise due to
different occupations. However, given this ambiguity, we want to assess whether controlling
for occupations makes a difference in our setting. If we look at the descriptive statistics
in table A2 in the appendix, we see that controlling for occupations as expected decreases
the remuneration gap in Europe on average. Comparing the demand and supply effects in
specification (1) to our baseline model (0) reveals that the influence from labor demand on
gender wage gaps is somewhat mitigated. Still, the demand effect remains statistically and
economically significant. Moreover, the difference in the demand effect between the baseline
model (0) and specification (1) is statistically not significant, as the point estimate of -1.18
26In Europe, employment in the public administration and defense sector accounts only for 7% of total
employment and the share of women working in this sector amounts to only 42%.
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still lies in the 95% confidence interval of the demand effect from the baseline specification,
which is [-2.1,-0.9]. However, if we were to assume that gender differences in occupations are
fully explained by preferences, we would infer that the increase in female labor demand has
reduced remuneration gaps by 2.8 percentage points on average over the entire observation
period (compared to 3.6 derived from the baseline model).
In the next two columns we vary the sample that is used to calculate gender wage gaps.
Specification (2) presents estimation results when remuneration gaps of age group 26-55 are
applied (instead of 16 to 65) as especially in the older group category country differences
could cause measurement errors (e.g. due to different pension laws). In specification (3) we
extend the sample by the group of self-employed (instead of using employees only). Again,
we see some slight variation in the magnitude of the coefficients. Notably, however, none of
the alterations significantly change our main findings.
Next, we want to see whether the obtained results are sensitive with respect to the weighting
factor (bi,s) that is calculated for a specific point in time (in our baseline specification for
the year 2003). We have seen that the relative abundance of female employees (i.e., the
gender intensity) in the respective sectors does hardly change over time when we look at the
European sample average (see figure xy). Still, in order to assess the influence from fixing
this parameter to a specific base, we re-calculate the demand variable by using the weighting
factor for the last year of our observation period. Hence, specification (4) reports the results
with gender intensities of 2013. Again, demand and supply effects remain nearly unaffected
by this alteration. The magnitude of the demand effect is slightly lower compared to our
baseline specification but again the difference is statistically not significant.
In the next specification we show that our results remain qualitatively the same if we use
a different data source to calculate the demand variable. As discussed in section 4.1, we
have employed data from national accounts to calculate the demand index for our baseline
specification as it covers all persons engaged in some productive activity. Here, we use data
from the labor force survey, which allows to re-calculate the demand variable based on a
somewhat finer sector classification (11 instead of 8 sectors). As shown in specification (5)
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the demand effect based on data from the alternative data source is somewhat smaller, but
the difference between the coefficients derived from this exercise and our baseline is not
statistically significant.
In specification (6) we want to see whether our empirical findings are affected by the global
financial and economic crisis that started in 2008. Therefore, we re-estimate our baseline
model allowing for different slope parameters of the demand and supply variable before
and after 2008. Obviously, the estimated effects are not different across the two sample
periods as both interaction terms (∆D×Crisis, ∆S×Crisis) are statistically insignificant.
This indicates that the estimated parameters of our baseline model are not biased due to
structural breaks triggered by the crisis. In our next exercise we re-estimate our model by
including time dummies, which were assumed to be zero in our baseline model. As we see
in specification (7) this is indeed the case. At the bottom of the table we report the p-value
from testing the joint significance of time dummies, which clearly indicates that time effects
have to be excluded from the model equation as they have no explanatory power.
Finally, in specification (8) we employ instrumental variable techniques to address the po-
tential endogeneity issue mentioned in the previous subsection. In particular, we apply the
feasible system GMM estimator introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998) which uses internal
instruments (i.e. time lags) for potentially endogenous variables (in our case the demand and
supply variable).27 The estimation results once again strengthen our baseline findings and
strongly support the significance of demand and supply effects in the determination of gender
wage gaps. Interestingly, in the short-run (a period of less than one year), the effects seem to
be higher compared to our baseline estimates. However, if we calculate the long-run impact
of both variables, the magnitude of the effects remain broadly the same. More specifically,
taken into account the parameter estimate of the lagged dependent variable ∆GAPt−1, we
arrive at a point estimate for the demand effect of -1.69 and an estimate for the supply effect
of 0.66.28
27Furthermore, we also add a lagged dependent variable given that the Arellano-Bond test confirms that
the disturbances are autocorrelated of order one (but not of order two). The estimation includes country
fixed effects. Testing for overidentifying restrictions indicates that the used set of instruments is valid across
all specifications. Test statistics can be obtained from the authors upon request.
28Note that we obtain long-run coefficients βˆ by βˆ = α/(1 − β), where α is the parameter on the lagged
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Taken together, the wide range of specifications has shown that the impact of demand and
supply factors on gender wage gaps is highly robust across European countries. Parameter
estimates, which are highly significant in each specification, vary from -1.1 to -1.7 for the
demand effect and from 0.5 to 0.8 for the supply effect and are thus not only statistically
but also economically significant.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the public sector is a ’swing demander’ for female
labor. That is, we have shown that changes in the growth of employment in highly publicly
influenced sectors have the potential to trigger economically significant fluctuations of the
gender wage gap.
Our calculations show that the increase in female labor demand in Europe has reduced the
corrected gender wage gap by 3.6 percentage points (being equivalent to a compression of
17%) in the period 2003 to 2013, all else equal. Furthermore, half of the increase in female
labor demand can be traced back to the expansion of employment in sectors that are highly
publicly influenced. Hence, had employment in the public sector remained constant in all
countries over the entire period, the corrected gender wage gap would have been higher by 1.8
percentage points on average (again, all else equal). This is an economically significant effect,
given that the corrected gender wage gap in Europe (accounting also for supply factors) has
been compressed by a total of 3.5 percentage points in the same period.
Our findings do have quite substantial implications that have a cyclical as well as a more
structural dimension. From a cyclical point of view, our results imply that consolidation poli-
cies – as far as they affect demand for public sector employment – will have an adverse impact
on the gender wage gap. This is not to say that consolidation has to be counter-productive
with regard to equal pay policies in any case. However, if consolidation is unaccompanied by
policies specifically tailored at reducing sectoral segregation it will likely exhibit unwarranted
dependent variable and β the short-run coefficient on the respective independent variable.
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effects on the gender wage gap. This implies that active labor market policies and retraining
activities become even more important during consolidation episodes.
From a more structural policy point of view, our results raise important questions for further
research. There are counter-veiling trends with regard to employment in the public sector.
On the one hand, demographics in all likelihood will trigger a substantial hike of employment
in the care sector in the future, likely increasing relative demand for female workers at the
medium-skilled segment. On the other hand however, the growth of employment in other
areas of the public sector will be probably more constrained amidst of over-stretched public
finances thereby arguably slowing the growth of relative demand for female workers at the
high skilled segment. In order to develop policies that aim at high employment and high
gender equality, it will be crucial to learn more about the likelihood of these developments
and their potential effects on relative demand and relative incomes at different skill-levels.
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7 Appendix
Table A1: Data-coverage and availability of certain variables
Year of survey
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
AT
BE
BG
CH
CY
CZ
DE
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
HR
HU
IE*
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
NO
PL
PT
RO*
SE
SI
SK
UK
( , , ) = Available EU-SILC cross-section datasets by country.
( ) = Dataset available but not used in analysis, ( , ) = Data used in analysis.
( ) = Work-experience variable available, ( ) = Age and education-dummies used as work-
experience proxies (potential experience).
Note that Spain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, and Portugal deliver gross income information only
since 2007 (2006 in the case of Spain). Belgium 2004 is excluded as the variable on work-
experience shows an exceptionally high fraction of missing data.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of gender wage gap estimations, sample mean over time
Different estimations of the remuneration gap
Total Total base- sector private public occup. selec- self- age
GAP GAPOB line dummy sector sector controls tion empl. 26-55
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AT 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.11
BT 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14
BG 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.25
HR 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.16
CY 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.23 0.30 0.52 0.34 0.36
CZ 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.25
DK 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.16
EE 0.32 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.39
FI 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.25
FR 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.22
DE 0.30 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.13
GR 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.16
HU 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15
IE 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.12
IT 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.13
LV 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.23 0.27
LT 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.17 0.22
LU 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.21
MT 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.11
NL 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12
NO 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.25
PL 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.14
PT 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.37 0.21 0.22
RO 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.16
SK 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.23
SI 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.15
ES 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.26 0.15 0.16
SE 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.18 0.24
CH 0.30 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.08
UK 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.17
Total 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19
Notes: Total GAP (1) represents the difference in (mean) log-hourly wages between male and female. Column (2) includes
the same measure as column (1) but is based on a restricted sample. This sample consists of only those observations
that enter the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, i.e. for which all control variables are available. Column (3) displays the
remuneration gap, which is the difference in log-hourly wages excluding differences in characteristics, i.e. the gender wage
gap after controlling for individual factors (baseline set of controls). Columns (4) to (10) present alternative estimations
of the remuneration gap: Column (4) controls for the sector (public sector dummy), column (5) uses the baseline set of
controls but restricts the sample to private sector employees, (6) restricts the sample to public sector employees, column
(7) includes occupational controls, column (8) controls for non-random selection into employment, column (9) extends the
sample by including self-employed persons and column (10) restricts the sample to 26-55 aged employees.
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